Ukraine Agrees to Trump-Proposed Ceasefire: Can Putin Be Trusted?
Ukraine has tentatively accepted a preliminary proposal from the Trump administration calling for a 30-day ceasefire, a potentially significant step towards ending the ongoing conflict with Russia. The proposal hinges on Russia’s acceptance of the terms, a hurdle that many observers see as substantial given Vladimir Putin’s track record.
The central question remains: can Putin be trusted to uphold any agreement, even one brokered by a figure he might perceive as more amenable than current Western leaders? Experts are deeply skeptical, citing Russia’s consistent violation of international agreements intended to safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty. These violations include the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances, and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, which recognized the existing borders between Russia and Ukraine. Both were disregarded in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in the Donbas region. The Minsk Agreements, attempts to de-escalate the conflict in eastern Ukraine, were similarly undermined.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, along with other world leaders and security officials, has voiced concerns about the possibility of a lasting peace deal with Russia. They emphasize Putin’s unreliability in adhering to international agreements without significant and binding security guarantees from the West.
Michael Ryan, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, argues that Russia operates on a "win-lose" paradigm. To prevent future aggression, Russia must perceive itself as a loser in the conflict. Ryan draws a parallel to the end of the Cold War, suggesting that only a clear defeat will deter future hostile actions.
Security officials emphasize that the focus should not be on trusting Putin, but on creating a situation where violating agreements carries significant consequences for Russia. Rebekah Koffler, a former DIA intelligence officer, warns that even with a peace deal, Russia will continue to engage in clandestine operations to expand its geopolitical influence. She expects ongoing election interference, cyber warfare, espionage, and destabilization efforts across the globe. Koffler asserts that in Russian strategic thinking, confrontation is a constant.
Ryan contends that any Trump-brokered peace deal must learn from the failures of past agreements, citing the Treaty of Versailles after World War I as an example of a flawed agreement that ultimately led to further conflict. He proposes a post-conflict strategy similar to the reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II, which involved economic reconciliation. Ryan suggests that Russia expected similar treatment after the Cold War, and that a failure to provide it has fueled resentment and instability. Rebuilding Ukraine, he argues, must include economic engagement with Russia to achieve lasting peace and potentially weaken Russia’s ties with China.
Several obstacles complicate the Trump administration’s efforts to negotiate with Putin. These include disputes over occupied territory, international recognition of annexed lands, the provision of international aid to Ukraine, the confiscation of frozen Russian assets, Zelenskyy’s political position in Ukraine, the return of prisoners of war, and the return of abducted Ukrainian children.
Peter Rough, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, points out that Putin has officially annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, as well as Crimea, but does not fully control all of the annexed regions. Rough questions whether Ukraine would agree to withdraw from the areas it currently controls, and whether the West would grant de jure recognition to Russian-occupied territories. He asserts that Putin would have to accept these constraints in a peace deal.
Koffler argues that Putin is unlikely to make concessions because he believes he is in a strong position, citing Russia’s significant advantage in combat potential. She notes that Putin began transitioning the Russian military and economy to a wartime footing seven years before the 2022 invasion. Koffler suggests that Putin believes he has prepared Russia to fight until the last Ukrainian and until NATO’s missile supplies are exhausted, echoing warnings issued by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte. She adds that Russia’s defense industry output in a three-month period equals NATO’s entire annual production.
Koffler argues that Putin is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire because he doesn’t want to give Ukraine, the US, and NATO a strategic pause to re-arm. She emphasizes that Putin distrusts both Washington and President Trump. However, she argues that he may distrust Trump even more than Biden because he finds Trump’s behavior unpredictable.
Ultimately, experts agree that too many variables exist to definitively determine whether Putin can be held accountable or trusted regarding future agreements. Koffler contends that Putin will not relinquish control of eastern Ukraine, as Ukraine represents a red line for him in terms of geopolitical control. She concludes that the only way to prevent future Russian aggression is to strengthen NATO, enhance its force posture, increase defense spending, secure its command-and-control networks, and develop comprehensive deterrence and counter-strategies that address all facets of Putin’s strategy.
