IDF Investigation Reveals Systemic Failures Leading to October 7th Hamas Attack
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has released a comprehensive, albeit preliminary, investigation into the events of October 7, 2023, the day Hamas launched a devastating attack on Israel. The probe, initiated in November 2023 and expanded in March 2024 by outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, aims to dissect the intelligence failures, strategic miscalculations, and operational shortcomings that allowed the unprecedented breach and massacre to occur. While the report refrains from offering specific recommendations, deferring them to incoming IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir, it paints a stark picture of a system that was fundamentally unprepared for the scale and brutality of the assault.
The investigation highlights the staggering statistics of the attack: between 5,000 and 5,600 militants infiltrated Israel in three waves, while nearly 4,700 rockets and mortars rained down on Israeli territory. The human cost was immense, with 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign nationals, and 415 security personnel killed. Furthermore, 251 individuals were taken hostage into the Gaza Strip, with the fate of 101 still unknown, a year later.
According to the IDF report, the fundamental flaw lay in a profound misjudgment of Hamas’s intentions and capabilities. Senior IDF officials acknowledge a critical failure to anticipate Hamas’s readiness and willingness to execute a large-scale surprise attack. This miscalculation stemmed from a series of interconnected misconceptions and systemic deficiencies that had taken root within the Israeli defense establishment.
The report traces the origins of Hamas’s operational planning back nearly seven years prior to the attack. The "fundamental concept" for the assault was reportedly formulated in November 2016, followed by an "initial plan" in July 2017. The plan was formally approved in July 2019 and the operational blueprint finalized in August 2021. As early as 2022, Hamas established a dedicated committee to evaluate options for implementing its plan, considering multiple dates, including significant Jewish holidays.
Ultimately, Hamas chose October 7, 2023, coinciding with Simchat Torah, a Jewish holiday marking the end and recommencement of the annual Torah reading cycle. The attack unfolded in the early hours of the day, with Hamas allegedly commencing preparations around 11:00 p.m. on October 6, following a day of alerts and weapons gathering. Briefings concluded by 4:00 a.m. on October 7.
The infiltration began at 6:29 a.m., with 1,154 members of Hamas’s elite Nukhba forces breaching the security barrier between Gaza and Israel. The IDF declared a state of emergency at 6:43 a.m., followed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) at 7:10 a.m. Between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., an estimated 3,400 militants had infiltrated Israeli territory. Shortly before 8:00 a.m., Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif called on civilians in Gaza to join the attacks. After 9:00 a.m., the attackers exploited IDF failures, seizing opportunities to further the assault, with some aiming to penetrate deeper into Israeli territory.
While the IDF managed to halt some of the main attacks around 1:00 p.m., hundreds of attackers remained inside Israel at 3:00 p.m. The IDF gradually regained control of communities and surrounding areas, but dozens of militants were still present around midnight. IDF officials admitted to underestimating Hamas’s brutality and combat capabilities.
Prior to October 7, the IDF’s primary focus was on Iran and Hezbollah, relegating Hamas to a secondary threat. The prevailing assumption was that Hamas’s activities could be contained while Israel worked towards "gradually improving the existing reality" with the ultimate goal of neutralizing the terror group. The IDF also mistakenly believed that Hamas did not desire a full-scale war, leading to the conclusion that a large-scale invasion was improbable. The report asserts that Hamas exploited this perception to its advantage.
Another critical misconception was the IDF’s focus on rockets and mortars fired from Gaza as the main threat. This, coupled with an overreliance on defensive tactics and the border barrier, alongside a reduction of troops on the Israel-Gaza border, contributed to the catastrophic outcome.
The report reveals a failure within the Intelligence Directorate to fully grasp and analyze available intelligence on Hamas’s intentions. This deficiency extended to the IDF’s overall understanding of the Shi’ite "Axis" and its views on Israel. The review uncovered deep-rooted systemic issues within the Intelligence Directorate, including problems with its culture and analytical processes.
Since 2018, the Intelligence Directorate had been gathering information on Hamas’s concept for a large-scale attack on Israel. However, this plan was dismissed as unfeasible and relegated to Hamas’s long-term aspirations. In August 2021, intelligence surfaced describing Hamas’s military wing’s plan for a large-scale assault on Israeli communities and military outposts surrounding the Gaza Strip. Tragically, intelligence officials failed to connect this new information with the data gathered in 2018.
In the months leading up to October 7, intelligence reports indicated that Hamas was conducting training exercises for raids. This prompted a change in assessment within Israel’s elite Unit 8200, but this change was allegedly not communicated to senior leadership.
On the evening of October 6, 2023, Israeli SIM cards were activated inside Gaza. While this had occurred previously, it was not flagged as a significant anomaly. These same SIM cards would later enable Hamas militants to communicate after crossing the border into Israel. There were also indications of Hamas leadership meetings that night. However, the IDF investigation concludes that these factors were insufficient to alter the Intelligence Directorate’s prevailing assessment of Gaza, and therefore no alert was issued.
The inquiry revealed that untapped intelligence sources could have been utilized overnight to enhance information gathering. However, the IDF maintains that even if the Intelligence Directorate had revised its assessment, it would have led to a higher alert for a localized Hamas offensive, but not a full-scale war.
The IAF was found to have met or exceeded defined readiness standards, with two exceptions due to heavy rocket fire. However, these standards were inadequate to prepare for a large-scale surprise attack. The IDF acknowledged "significant difficulty" in distinguishing IDF troops, civilians, and terrorists from one another during the chaos of the attack.
While the IAF struck key Hamas command centers, the IDF admits that it is difficult to determine, even in retrospect, whether a more effective strike effort could have been mounted given the circumstances.
Ultimately, the IDF concludes that it was unprepared for the unprecedented brutality of the October 7 massacre. Senior officials acknowledged a dangerous reliance on precise intelligence and a failure to consider alternative scenarios. This failure, they wrote, "will forever be etched in our memories, and we will never and should never forget."
The IDF’s conclusion emphasizes the entrenchment of the established assessment regarding Gaza and Hamas, which stifled deep discussion about alternative possibilities. The report now acknowledges that it was "incorrect" to attempt to "conflict manage" Hamas, and that future strategies must prioritize the removal of threats. The assessment stresses the importance of a preventative strategy to mitigate the possibility of future attacks.
The released report constitutes a preliminary, yet significant, step towards understanding the systemic failures that led to the devastating events of October 7. The deferred recommendations from the incoming IDF Chief of Staff will likely focus on intelligence reform, strategic recalibration, and operational adjustments to ensure that such a catastrophic failure is never repeated.
