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Zelenskyy, Trump, and a U.S.-Ukraine Peace Deal Gone Wrong

Ukraine, Zelenskyy, Trump, Russia, Peace Deal, US Foreign Policy, JD Vance, Europe, NATO, War, Conflict, Diplomacy, Negotiations, US-Ukraine Relations, US-Russia Relations, Geopolitics, International Relations, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Elections, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Donald Trump, Putin, Biden, Netanyahu, Obama, Clinton, Obama-Clinton-Biden Gang, China, DEFCON 2, Donbass, Crimea, Ukraine-splaining.

A Rocky Road to Peace: Analyzing the Fallout from the Trump-Zelenskyy Meeting

The recent Oval Office meeting between President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has cast a long shadow over the prospects for a U.S.-brokered peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. The encounter, described as "extraordinary," seems to have veered off course, raising serious questions about the future of the conflict and the role the United States can play in resolving it. Several factors appear to have contributed to the breakdown, each laden with implications for the war and its potential resolution.

One crucial aspect is Zelenskyy’s perceived misjudgment of the shifting geopolitical landscape. The author suggests that the Ukrainian President may be clinging to outdated assumptions about the support he can expect from traditional allies. The article argues that Zelenskyy places too much faith in Western globalists, the American Left, and European nations, despite their diminished influence in 2025. Simultaneously, he seemingly antagonizes the very actors who now possess the leverage to influence the situation, namely Trump and his administration. This dynamic suggests that Zelenskyy’s strategy might be based on a flawed understanding of the current power structures. The implication is that the President is being ill-advised, perhaps by figures aligned with the Obama-Clinton-Biden legacy, whose interests may not perfectly align with those of Ukraine.

Another point of contention lies in Zelenskyy’s seeming assumption that Ukrainian and American agendas are perfectly aligned. While the two nations share common interests, the author emphasizes that their priorities are not entirely identical. Trump’s primary objective is to reset relations with Russia and leverage that relationship to counter China’s growing influence. He seeks to de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine to avoid a dangerous confrontation with a nuclear power, reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, the author claims that Trump genuinely desires to end the "Stalingrad slaughterhouse" in Eastern Europe. This divergence in strategic goals may create friction, as Zelenskyy’s focus on reclaiming territory and securing unwavering support from the West might clash with Trump’s desire for a broader geopolitical realignment.

The article also casts a critical eye on Europe’s capacity and willingness to shoulder more of the burden in supporting Ukraine. While European nations and Canada are vocal about pursuing a more independent stance, the author expresses skepticism about their ability to translate those words into concrete action. For Europe to truly become a muscular antithesis to Russia, it would need to undergo significant internal reforms, including curtailing its social welfare systems, embracing energy independence through fracking and nuclear power, abandoning its green agenda, and substantially increasing defense spending. The U.S. currently carries a disproportionate share of NATO’s financial burden and provides security guarantees for Europe through its military presence and nuclear umbrella. The question remains whether Europe is truly prepared to take on these responsibilities.

The author contends that the core obstacles to a peaceful resolution have already been addressed. Ukraine is now better equipped than many NATO members, yet it will not be admitted into the alliance. Furthermore, no president is likely to provide Ukraine with the means to retake the Donbass and Crimea by force. The remaining issues, therefore, center on the extent of Russia’s withdrawal to its 2022 borders and the mechanisms for deterring future aggression. The author proposes a commercial sector/tripwire, joint Ukrainian-US-Europe resource development corridor in Eastern Ukraine, coupled with a Korea-like DMZ, as a potential solution to the territorial dispute. The deterrence factor, the author argues, lies in the significant losses Russia has already sustained in the conflict, deterring further advances into Ukraine.

The article prompts consideration of Zelenskyy’s alternative options in the absence of strong U.S. support. Should he wait for a potential Democratic return to the White House in four years? Should he hope for a rearmed Europe? Should he pray for a Democratic House and a third politically motivated Trump impeachment? Or should he reconcile with the current administration, sign the rare-earth minerals deal, invite European involvement in patrolling a DMZ, and rely on Trump’s ability to deter Putin from further aggression? These are difficult choices with potentially far-reaching consequences for Ukraine’s future.

The article also questions the potential outcomes of a ceasefire, a commercial deal, a European ground presence, and an influx of Western companies into Ukraine. Would elections be held, and if so, would Zelenskyy and his party emerge victorious? And if not, would the successor government be transparent in revealing the destination of all Western financial aid? These questions underscore the complexities of transitioning from war to peace and the challenges of ensuring accountability and stability in a post-conflict Ukraine.

The author draws a parallel between Zelenskyy and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggesting that Zelenskyy could learn from Netanyahu’s approach to navigating difficult relationships with world leaders. Despite facing criticism from the Biden Administration, Netanyahu managed to maintain a close relationship with Israel’s key ally, and always showed respect for the leader. The author suggests that Zelenskyy’s outburst during the meeting may have damaged his relationship with Trump.

The article questions Zelenskyy’s strategic vision. If Ukraine has alienated the United States, what is its plan for achieving victory? Does it rely on increased European support? Can it withstand an increasingly emboldened Russian military? Is it prepared to cede more territory? The author suggests that Zelenskyy’s hand may not be as strong as he believes.

According to the author, the meeting between Trump, Zelenskyy and Vance was going well until Zelenskyy started correcting Vance and then Trump. By "Ukraine-splaining" to his hosts, and through his gestures, tone, and interruptions, he demonstrated his assumption that Trump was merely another compliant, clueless figure like Biden.

The author concludes by emphasizing the changed circumstances since the beginning of the conflict. Zelenskyy is no longer the international hero of 2022. He has postponed elections, outlawed opposition media and parties, suspended habeas corpus and walked out of negotiations when he had an even hand in spring 2022 and apparently even now when he does not in spring 2025.

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